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Combinations, Concerted Practices
and Cartels: Adopting the Concept of
Conspiracy in European Community
Competition Law
Julian M. Joshua* & Sarah Jordan**
The statutory phrase "contract, combination or conspiracy" conjures
up the classic image of robber barons gathering clandestinely to
carve up a market. The statute, classically conceived, aims at a bad
conduct, at conspirators who deliberately decide upon evil, who
eschew competition, who plan and execute action to strike market
forces who, conscious of their own wrongdoing, take precautions to
hide their own conduct or disguise it.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Justice's effortless assumption of leadership
in the "war on cartels" should not obscure the record of the European
Commission ("Commission") in tracking down and fining huge
international price fixing rings. As early as 1980, highly sophisticated and
entirely clandestine Europe-wide cartels, organized at the highest level, had
been uncovered in billion dollar industries and were later sanctioned with
individual corporate fines of $10 million or more that exceeded by many
times those being collected by the U.S. Department of Justice under Section
1 of the Sherman Act.2
* Partner, Howrey, Simon, Arnold & White, LLP (Brussels). Mr. Joshua was an official
in Competition Directorate of the European Commission from 1973 to 2000. At the time of
his departure in 2000, he was Deputy Head of the Cartel Unit.
** Associate, Howrey, Simon, Arnold & White, LLP (Brussels).
1 LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST LAW 311 (1977).
2 See, e.g., Commission Decision on Peroxygen Products, 1985 O.J. (L 35) 1;
Commission Decision on Polypropylene, 1986 O.J. (L 230) 1; Commission Decision on
PVC, 1989 O.J. (L 74) 2; Commission Decision on LdPE, 1989 0.. (L 74) 21; Commission
Decision on Cartonboard, 1994 O.J. (L 243) 1. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2003).
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With the Commission as the only body with the supra-national
competence to act against pan-European cartels during the early 1980s,
there was little existing practice and conceptual thinking that rendered it an
apt body for tracking down, proving to an acceptable legal standard and
punishing major cartels in European industries. During the 1970s, most
analysis, whether judicial or academic, had centered on what some
considered the "distinction without a difference" between "agreement" and
"concerted practice" in Article 81 of the EC Treaty,3 whereas a more
fruitful line of inquiry might have been to distinguish these prohibited
forms of collusive behavior from lawful, albeit anti-competitive, conduct.4
With its focus on assessing for compatibility with the EC Treaty openly-
practiced commercial agreements and encouraged by the availability of the
"notification" mechanism, the Commission likely believed it had its hands
full enough, and even if it had suspected the existence in European industry
of a vast underground network of cartel behavior, it would not have
regarded hunting down conspiracies as a priority. The Commission's
culture in competition cases fostered a methodology of fitting the clauses of
a commercial contract into one or another compartment marked with a
convenient legal label. None of this static analysis provided the
Commission with a legal rule for dealing with cartels.
With the arrival of a new generation of officials from common law
countries in 1973, the borrowing, never explicit, but nonetheless
progressive, of the common law notion of "conspiracy" from the Sherman
Act provided the Commission with both the evidential and the legal
framework for tackling the phenomenon of covert, sophisticated and
devious cartel behavior. 5 Conspiracy has long been one of the most
controversial areas of criminal law on both sides of the Atlantic. The word
itself is redolent with unpleasant connotations of behavior that is illegal,
furtive, treacherous and difficult to prove. Conspiracy may be an
amorphous concept that is not amenable to easy definition,6 but it provided
3 See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMuNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3,
(1997) (hereinafter EC TREATY].
4 See, e.g., Cases T-1/89-4/89, Rhone v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 11-867 (review of
academic writing on the definition of "concerted practice" in the opinion of Judge
Vesterdorf, acting as Advocate General); Case 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma v. Commission,
1970 E.C.R. 661; Luis Miguel Pais Antunes, Agreements and Concerted Practices under
EEC Competition Law: Is the Distinction Relevant?, 11 Y.B. OF EUR. LAW 57 (1990); Rene
Joliet, La Notion de Pratique Concertee et l'Arret LC.L dans une Pespective Comparative
[The Notion of Concerted Practices and the Halt of the L C.L in a Comparative Perspective],
3-4 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 251 (1974); Valentine Korah, Concerted Practices, 36
MOD. L. REv. 220 (1973).
5 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2003).
6 The evolution of the law of conspiracy in the United States had its judicial critics. For
example, Justice Jackson deplored the "drift" in the federal law of conspiracy and eloquently
described conspiracy as an "elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense," adding that "the
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the means for the Commission to bring what is now recognized as the most
insidiously harmful threat to a competitive economy within the purview of
effective legal control.
This article charts the progress of, and the vicissitudes faced by, the
incorporation into the European Community legal order of the peculiarly
common law concept of conspiracy as the vehicle not only for analytical
purposes, by characterizing full-blown cartels as "agreements" in the sense
of Article 81 of the EC Treaty, but also to resolve the multiplicity of
evidential issues presented by complex, pernicious and secretive behavior.
The article also shows how the uncovering of deliberate and secretive
business delinquency, practiced at the highest levels in some of Europe's
most respected corporations and summed up by the negative connotations
of the concept of "conspiracy" has itself subtly contributed to altering
hitherto tolerant European perceptions of cartel conduct, and has moved the
paradigm for legal control of cartels in Europe from an administratively-
minded concertation on the economic aspects to a conduct-based test that
focuses on delinquency and recidivism.
A. Placing Article 81 in the Market Context
As a legal instrument for prohibiting cartels, Article 81 of the EC
Treaty7 at first sight provides the Commission with a seemingly well-aimed
normative tool for assessing the legality of collusive conduct.
In terms that contain a distinct echo of the Sherman Act's
condemnation of every "contract, combination.. .or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states," Article 81 (1) prohibits "all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
member states and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.",
8
The comfort zone for U.S. antitrust lawyers is, however, deceptive.
Article 81 and the Sherman Act do not share the same position in the
spectrum of condemnatory responses to cartel organization. 9 While the
modem law of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition... it also, chameleon-
like, takes on a special coloration from each of the many independent offenses on which it
may be overlaid." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949). Justice Jackson
was condemning bringing conspiracy charges when the evidence showed the commission of
the full offense, but recognized that conspiracy in federal law "aggravates the degree of
crime over that of unconcerted offending." Id. at 449.
7 This Article was originally numbered as "Article 85" in the EC Treaty. References in
this paper are made to Article 81, except where older cases are discussed. The two are,
however, identically worded.
8 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2003); EC TREATY, supra note 3, at art. 81(1).
9 For a concise comparison of the similarities and differences between E.U. competition
law and U.S. antitrust law, see Stephen P. Reynolds, International Antitrust Competence for
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Sherman Act is judicially enforced as part of the ordinary law of the land,
and is backed by criminal sanctions on both corporations and individuals,
Article 81 was conceived as part of a system of administrative control
operated by the Commission, which has no powers over individuals, no
criminal law jurisdiction and can impose fines only on companies.
Moreover, the prohibition is by no means an absolute one. If it is expressed
in broad terms, the object of Article 81's apparently clear prohibition on
restrictive agreements and practices was not to outlaw and punish all
restraints of competition. Rather, it was the morally neutral objective of
bringing within the ambit of administrative surveillance the whole gamut of
commercial arrangements and practices that could affect trade between the
member states of the then European Economic Community and permit their
economic evaluation in terms of the Commission's mission of breaking
down trade barriers. 10 It would be a misconception to allow the tough-
sounding language of the first paragraph with its explicit ban on price
fixing, market sharing and quotas "in particular" to obscure the equally
important provision that permits exemption under Article 81(3). The
Commission and the Courts have always interpreted Article 81(3) broadly
so as to favor the economic scrutiny of ordinary commercial arrangements
that by no stretch of the imagination could be stigmatized as a "conspiracy."
Indeed the Commission has throughout the years used its power to exempt
and impose conditions under Article 81(3) as a potent instrument for the
development of European competition policy.
A more than perfunctory reading of Article 81, even without
proceeding to Article 81(3), reveals its underlying rationale of economic
evaluation. If an agreement or practice is prohibited (and thus void) it is
because the real objection is not to its effect upon competition as such, but
rather to its incompatibility with the common market. As one leading
commentator observes: "[t]he essential feature of Article 81(1) is that its
application in any given case depends upon the economic aims or effects of
transactions entered into between undertakings.'1 2
The immediate object of protection is thus not the consumer or even of
the notion of "competition" as such but the European "vision" of a certain
type of market organization. There is no trace of the moral censure that is
found in the "conspiracy" language of the Sherman Act and fosters the
a Company with Multilateral Observations, 8 INT'L Q. 76 (1996).
10 CHRISTOPHER HARDING & JULIAN JOSHUA, REGULATING CARTELS IN EUROPE: A STUDY
OF LEGAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE DELINQUENCY 109 (2003).
1 Ian Forrester & Christopher Norall, The Laicization of Community Law: Self-Help and
the Rule of Reason: How Competition Law is and Could be Applied, 21 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 11 (1984) (containing an account of the early development of EC competition law). See
also D.G. GOYDER, EC COMPETITION LAW, chs. 3-4 (3d ed. 2001).
12 SIR CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM CHILD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF
COMPETITION § 1-042 (5th ed. 2001).
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criminalization of prohibited conduct. Indeed, in contrast with the
peremptory notion of the per se violation which had emerged in Sherman
Act jurisprudence by the 1940s,13 there are in strict law no intrinsic
infringements of Article 81. The European Court of First Instance has gone
out of its way, not entirely helpfully, to observe that no restriction of
competition is automatically disqualified as a matter of law from receiving
the benefit of Article 81(3). 14
Thus in Article 81, there is no clear differential treatment of cartel
behavior as a distinct object of antitrust control. This broad brush treatment
of restraints of trade in Article 81 underlines the significant gap in
conceptual thinking towards the control of cartels in the United States and
in Europe. The U.S. approach since the passage of the Sherman Act has
been one of unalloyed censure of cartels with ready recourse to
criminalization, while in Europe, legislators, regulators and lawyers have
historically regarded cartels as morally neutral and based their assessment
on an economic evaluation and analysis.
1 5
B. The Nature of Conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
The Sherman Act was passed "against a background of rampant
cartelization and monopolization of the American economy.", 6 Its basic
objective was to preserve competitive pricing, and price fixing was
rendered illegal.17 The notion of combination or conspiracy as used in the
13 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (everything that is
properly regarded as criminal under Section 1 is judged by a per se rule, but not all per se
violations are considered apt for criminal prosecution). For the line between conduct that is
considered appropriate for prosecution and that which is to be pursued civilly, see Donald 1.
Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging, 69
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693 (2001); Donald I. Baker, To Indict or not to Indict: Prosecutorial
Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1978).
14 See, e.g., Case T-17/93, Matra-Hachette S.A. v. EC Commission, 1994 ECR 11-595,
para. 85 (no presumption in Community Law that any type of agreement is inherently
capable of qualifying for exemption). This sounds rather like judicial hair-splitting, since in
practice the phenomenon of the "serious violation" which will never qualify under Article
81(3) has been developed through case law. See generally CHRISTOPHER HARDING,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INVESTIGATIONS AND SANCTIONS: THE SUPRANATIONAL CONTROL OF
BUSINESS DELINQUENCY (1993). But see Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed
Pursuant to Article 15(2) Regulation 17/62, 1998 O.J. (C 3) 9 (in these court-approved
guidelines, price fixing and market sharing cartels are categorized as "very serious
infringements").
15 HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note 10, at ch. 2; Christopher Harding, Business Cartels as
a Criminal Activity: Reconciling North American and European Models of Regulation, 9
MAASTRICHT J. OF EuR. & CORP. L. 393 (2002).
16 RICHARD POSNER, ANTI-TRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 23 (1976).
17 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "every contract, combination in the form of
a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I
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Sherman Act was said by some to have been derived from the common
law,' 8 as was the concept of "restraint of trade." The latter assumption has
been dismissed more recently as fundamentally mistaken since the common
law of trade restraints had little to do with promoting competition, 19 but it
was to embroil judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act in a controversy
that split the U.S. Supreme Court into two bitterly opposed camps for
years.
What the Sherman Act took from the pure common law form of
conspiracy was the notion of "agreement:" a conspiracy is in effect an
agreement to commit an unlawful act.2' Usually the objective has to
involve committing an offense, the ostensible (and simplistic) policy
rationale for the invocation of the criminal law at this early stage being the
need to frustrate the commission of crime. In the normal criminal law
setting, conspiracy is thus an "inchoate" offense. However, Section 1 of the
Sherman Act was an example of the type of statutory conspiracy where
neither the underlying end, nor the means adopted, were in themselves
unlawful. Rather, it was the enacting statute itself which created the initial
illegality. The usual common law justification cited above for the existence
of the conspiracy offense is hardly apposite in the case of the Sherman Act
conspiracy. For a company to set its own price, no matter how high it is, is
of course entirely legal under the antitrust legislation: price fixing is only
unlawful under the Sherman Act where it is the result of a "conspiracy."
The gist of the crime of conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act centers on
the agreement itself. Unlike some enactments of statutory conspiracies, no
overt act is necessary. A conspiracy under Section 1 is on "the common
(2003). While the courts developed a "rule of reason" to mitigate the literal application of
the prohibition to almost every business agreement, defendants are not allowed to argue that
their fixed prices are "reasonable:" only competitively set prices are reasonable and
collusively-fixed prices are deemed unreasonable.
18 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (explaining why the Sherman Act
did not condemn all conduct which restrained trade); James Rahl, Conspiracy and the
Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743 (1950) (observing that to lawyers in 1890, a direct
prohibition of a restraint of trade would probably have appeared meaningless, since it could
not come into being without the exchange of promises between two persons, usually as
ancillary to the execution of a property or employment agreement).
19 See POSNER, supra note 16, at 23-24, citing Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the
Policy of the Sherman Act, 6 J. LAW & ECON. 7 (1966).
20 RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA 1888-1992: HISTORY,
RHETORIC, LAW 27-38 (1996) (describing the emergence of the "rule of reason" from the
fractional conflict between the "Liberalists" and the "Rule of the Reasonists" which
"involved a clash between factions holding opposite visions of society").
2 English criminal lawyers invariably used to tell juries that conspiracy was an
"agreement to commit an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means," a formulation
inaccurately known as "Lord Denman's Antithesis." Lord Denman, an eminent Lord Chief
Justice, did not invent it; when he said it, he did not intend it as a definition, and when it was
quoted back to him he said it was incorrect.
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law footing:', 22 it is not dependent on the doing of any act other than the act
of conspiring as a condition of liability. The crime of conspiracy is
complete once the agreement is made, but while "the unlawful agreement
satisfies the definition of the crime... it does not exhaust it."23  The
subsequent actions of the alleged conspirators are not only the usual means
by which the initial agreement is proved but may also form part of the
crime of conspiracy itself. If the conspirators continue their combined
efforts in pursuance of the plan, the conspiracy continues until
abandonment or success.24  One of the many peculiar and contradictory
characteristics of conspiracy which distinguishes legal analysis of the
"conspiracy agreement" from that of a commercial contract is that it has a
"timely" dimension and can indeed evolve and change over its duration. A
continuous conspiracy is one that "contemplates bringing to pass a
continuous result that will not continue without the continuous cooperation
of the conspirators to keep it up. ''25 The approach which best illustrates this
concept is a "partnership in crime," or more accurately, a partnership in
criminal purposes. Thus Justice Holmes stated in United States v. Kissel:
A conspiracy in restraint of trade is different from and more than a contract in
restraint of trade. A conspiracy is constituted by an agreement, it is true, but it is
the result of the agreement, rather than the agreement itself, just as a partnership,
although constituted by a contract, is not the contract, but the result of it. The
contract is instantaneous; the partnership may endure as one and the same
partnership for years. A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes.26
While the formulation comprehensively covers all forms of conspiracy, the
connotations of mutual support and encouragement are particularly apt to
22 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (requirement of an
"overt act" in execution of the conspiracy is not imposed by common law, but has been
enacted in many statutes).
23 United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 607 (1910).
24 The English law of conspiracy has never been comfortable with its application to the
continuing combination, as opposed to the initial agreement. Perhaps the closest that
English law has come to recognizing the temporal aspect of the conspiracy was in Director
of Public Prosecutions v. Doot, App. Cas. 807 (1973), in which Viscount Dilhome ruled that
"a conspiracy does not end with the making of the agreement. It continues so long as the
parties to the agreement intend to carry it out. It may be joined by others, some may leave
it." In the same case, Lord Pearson conferred that "the fact that the offence of conspiracy is
complete at that stage does not mean that the conspiratorial agreement is finished with. It is
not dead. If it is being performed, it is very much alive." Id.
25 Kissel, 218 U.S. at 607.
26 Id. at 608. English law has been less successful in articulating the "temporal"
dimension of conspiracy, emphasizing that subsequent actions are not part of the actus reus
of the crime. See R. v. Hammersley, 42 Cr. App. R. 207 (1958) (stating that "[tihe
agreement, and nothing but the agreement, is what the law is intended to punish"). This
view has been excoriated by Lord Diplock, one of England's most distinguished judges, as
"the height of sophistry." See Knuller v. DPP, 546 Cr. App. R. 633, 672 (1973) (observing
that the law was using "agreement" as a fiction to punish conduct of which it disapproved).
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encompass price fixing among ostensible competitors. Under the classic
price fixing cartel, competitors cooperate so as to substitute collusion for
competition and thus create an anti-competitive restraint that would not
otherwise be possible. The participants, by replacing competition with
collaboration, can enhance their market power and control a market which
as individuals they could not.
It is possible that the wording of the Sherman Act-"contracts,
combinations or conspiracies"-was simply the reflection of the Nineteenth
Century draftsman's fancy for alliteration. "Combination" may not have
had much of a statutory history in U.S. law but in England, indictments
under the Treason-Felony Act charged defendants that they did "combine,
conspire, confederate and agree with" other persons. While much scholarly
effort in the United States was at one time devoted to demonstrating that
"combination" had a meaning and content different from that of a
conspiracy or contract, 27 U.S. lawyers now generally agree that the
"disjunctive Triad" of Section 1 reduces "combination" to a single broad
concept "roughly equivalent to concerted action.
',28
The choice by U.S. legislators to include conspiracy in the Sherman
Act was serendipitous. With the application of the Sherman Act depending
so heavily on the scope to be given to the idea of "agreement," its definition
has for many years been an "important and continuous legal battleground."
In the earliest cases, there were few definitional problems since the cartels
put their arrangements into formal contracts and the government could
establish the exact terms of the agreement. 29 The dispute turned not on the
existence of the necessary element of agreement but on its legality.30 The
inevitable result was that the cartels went underground and while still
27 See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403 (1904) (Holmes J.,
dissenting) (observing that "[t]he words hit two classes of cases, and only two - Contracts in
restraint of trade and combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade[]"); James E. S.
Baker, Combinations and Conspiracies - Is there a Difference?, 14 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 71
(1969).
28 LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 339 (3d
1977); Rahl, supra note 18, at 744 (pointing out that while the "moral overtones" of the two
words are different, the desire "to advance some sensible distinction between 'combination'
and 'conspiracy' has been abandoned").
29 See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
30 There was uncertainty during the late 1890s on the scope and reach of the Sherman Act
and it was unclear whether judges would apply reasonableness standards to price fixing and
other cartel agreements. Defendants in these early cases acknowledge the existence of the
agreement but argued that these did not fall within the Section 1 prohibition. See United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). See also United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 271. See also
William E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements Under the
Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 5, 15-16 (1993).
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maintaining their (now illegal) agreements in force as before, the
participants made sure that no direct evidence was left lying around to help
the authorities prove their case.3 '
If the criminalization of price fixing may have led cartel participants in
the United States to cover their tracks, the adoption in the Sherman Act of
the common law notion of conspiracy had the immense advantage for the
government and for private plaintiffs, that the agreement could be proved
by the same sort of evidence as the traditional criminal conspiracy. These
benefits include the facts that no formal agreement is required, it may be
express or implied, and it is not even necessary to prove the terms of any
particular agreement or plan. Conspiracy may be demonstrated by concert
of action between the participants all working together for a common
32purpose. What is more, a conspiracy has to be viewed as a whole, the
component parts-which may be unobjectionable by themselves or taken
individually-are not to be weeded out and enquired into separately.33 A
lawful device may be part of the conspiracy.3 4 As regards the practicalities
of evidence, the recognition by Courts that by their very nature criminal
conspiracies were rarely capable of proof by direct evidence or testimony
allowed proof by circumstantial evidence alone. Most important perhaps is
what in the United States is sometimes inaccurately called the "co-
conspirator exception to the hearsay rule." Under this exception, once the
existence of the joint enterprise and the identity of the participants in it are
shown by "foundation evidence," the acts and declarations of one
conspirator "in the furtherance" of the conspiracy are admissible in
31 The courts may in such circumstances take inferences from indirect evidence in
reaching the conclusion that the conspirators entered into an express agreement to follow a
given course. SULLIVAN, supra note 28, at 313. See also Kovacic, supra note 30, at 17.
32 The U.S. Supreme Court has found that "[w]here the circumstances are such as to
warrant a jury in finding that the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design
and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement, the conclusion that a
conspiracy is established is justified." American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 810 (1946).
33 The U.S. Supreme Court has stressed that in an antitrust conspiracy case the evidence
should not be fragmented or compartmentalized: "[i]t hardly needs statement that the
character and effect of a conspiracy is not to be judged by dismembering it and viewing its
separate parts, but only by looking at it as a whole." United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525,
544 (1913) (citations omitted); See also Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 385-386
(1905). In Dyestuffs, the European Court of Justice also emphasized that the evidence must
not be compartmentalized: "The question whether there was a concerted action in this case
can only be correctly determined if the evidence upon which the contested decision is based
is considered, not in isolation, but as a whole." Case 48/69, Imperial Chem. Indus. v.
Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 619, at para. 68.
34 It is not the form of the conspiracy but the result achieved that is condemned, so it is
irrelevant whether the means used are in themselves lawful or unlawful. American Tobacco
Co., 328 U.S. at 809.
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evidence against all the rest.35 When the existence of the conspiracy itself
is shown, relatively little evidence is then necessary to connect a party to it
so as to render his statement or action admissible against the others.3 The
actors in a conspiracy do not have to take part in all its activities in order to
be equally guilty of the offence along with the others.37 They do not even
all have to meet together.38 The members can join it or leave it at any time,
but the conspiracy goes on.39
C. The European Administrative Model
While U.S. policy officially condemned cartels and prosecuted them,
however unevenly and leniently, under the Sherman Act, cartels continued
to be a dynamic presence in Europe between the wars. Once the sinister
role played by cartels in supporting totalitarian regimes had become
apparent, U.S. sponsored post-war initiatives were undertaken but then
foundered on the shoals of political unwillingness on both sides of the
Atlantic to submit to a supranational system of control. Cartels remained
the normal way of doing business in Europe and many of the old
35 A conspiracy is deemed to create an ad hoc agency relationship between the
conspirators so what one does or says is considered to be the execution of the common
purpose and therefore admissible as primary evidence against the rest of the parties. This is
the so-called "co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule," although strictly under Rule
801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a co-conspirator statement is not regarded as
hearsay at all but as original evidence. In order for the co-conspirator statement to be
admissible against all other parties, there needs to be "foundation evidence" that the joint
enterprise existed between the declarant and the other parties. See e.g., Continental Baking
Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960); United States v. Johns-Mansville Corp.,
231 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1963); see also United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co., 107 F. Supp. 324, 325 (Del. 1952) (finding that "[a] declaration of a co-conspirator is
admissible even though made only to other members of the co-conspirator's organization").
See also Julian Mathic Joshua, Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases: A Comparison
with the Rules of Evidence in Common Law, 12 EUR. L. REV. 315, 324-28 (1987).
36 "[O]nce a conspiracy is proved a relatively small amount of evidence connecting a
particular defendant with that conspiracy will suffice to sustain a guilty verdict." Morton
Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d. 573, 580 (10th Cir. 1956). For the evidentiary
advantages conferred on prosecutors by charging conspiracy, see W. A. Holman, Evidence in
Conspiracy Cases, 4 AUSTRALIAN L. J. 247 (1930); Solomon A. Klein, Conspiracy - the
Prosecutor's Darling, 24 BROOK. L. REv. 1 (1957).
37 If a participant's act was done pursuant to the conspiracy, he is equally liable at law
with all the other participants, irrespective of the greater or lesser degree of his role. United
States v. Bausch & Lomb, 34 F. Supp. 267, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
38 A participant may be part of a conspiracy even without having any knowledge of what
the other conspirators are doing at any time. The conspirators may not necessarily be doing
the same thing as the other conspirators at the same time. What is important is that they all
intend to contribute to the common purpose or scheme. United States v. Atlantic Co., (DC
Ga. 1950) 1950-1951 Trade Cases.
39 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646 (1946); Director of Public Prosecutions
v. Doot, App. Cas. 807 (1973).
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arrangements were resurrected.
While government attitudes towards cartels in Europe underwent a
significant change during the 1950s with the adoption of national schemes
for regulation of cartels, the approach to regulation that emerged,
characterized as the "European model," was one of administrative control
rather than legal prohibition. Cartel activity rarely attracted direct
sanctions; rather regulatory efforts focused on the monitoring of
arrangements with government intervention in the case of "abuse" being
identified. Traditionally, European attitudes concentrated on the outcome
of conduct rather than its characteristics, with regulatory efforts directed
towards compliance based on recommendations and persuasion, or to put it
in a modem way, control was a matter of "soft" law.
Even when Article 85 of the EC Treaty was enacted and the
Commission was given the necessary powers under Council Regulation No.
17/62 to police its observance, the "notification" system, coupled with a
(then) regime of legal certainty for operating restrictive agreements, meant
that its main efforts, even in the direction of horizontal arrangements, were
devoted towards the scrutiny of openly-practiced trading structures and
organizations which were aimed at the protection of national markets
against competition from other member states.
D. Early Experience with Cartels
The Commission's early experience in cartel matters mirrors that of
the Sherman Act in that in the early cases no definitional problem of what
"agreement" meant even arose. The parties to formal cartel agreements
dutifully notified their arrangements to the Commission fully expecting to
receive at the very worst an exemption under Article 85(3). They were
quite hurt when the Commission-in what was perceived at the time as an
overly harsh approach-recommended them to cease and desist on the basis
of an informal settlement. Any action, such as it was, took place through a
low profile process of negotiation, and fines were unknown. These early
cases almost all involved contractual selling arrangements on a national
market operated by trade associations and designed to protect the home
team from inconvenient outside competition. Eventually the Commission's
opposition to such arrangements became known. In two important
"cement" cases, where the formal cartel agreements had been notified to the
Commission, a prohibition decision was adopted, although no question of
fines arose as the notification process protected the operators from
penalties. 40  Even the most obstinate cartels have a learning curve and
eventually the flow of notifications of overt quota and market allocation
40 Cases 8/66-11/66, Socidtd Anonyme Cimenteries v. Commission, 1967 E.C.R. 75;
Case 8/72, Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 977.
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agreements dried up.
Although the lack of notifications should have aroused suspicion,
cartel cases did not feature prominently on the Commission's agenda, even
if the Commission had the means available under Council Regulation No.
17/62 to investigate and sanction price-fixers. In Re in Cartel Quinine, the
first "'cartel" case involving fines to come to the Court, a defensive cartel
had been set up between French, German and Dutch producers, and the
Commission was not notified.4' The arrangements only came to light
through a U.S. Congressional investigation which had prompted a
Commission enquiry and resulted in fines-then considered severe-of
around $200,000 being imposed on the ringleaders in July 1969.42 The
fines were largely upheld by the Court of Justice 43 in what was a relatively
clear-cut case. A so-called "gentlemen's agreement" with no legal
sanctions to enforce it was treated as an Article 85 agreement. Thus, it was
already clear by this time that the term "agreement" in Article 85 was not
confined to legally binding contracts.
E. The Concept of Concerted Practice: The Legacy of Dyestuffs
In other cases around the time of Re Quinine, the direct evidence of an
express agreement was sparse and the concept of the "concerted practice"
came to the forefront to catch what was believed to be "informal"
cooperation. In Imperial Chemical Industries v. Commission44 (the
"Dyestuffs case" or "Dyestuffs cartel") a cast of characters assembled that
formed the dramatis personae of a series of repeat performances and
desperately fought, with some success, rearguard actions that were to bog
down the Commission and Courts in interminable sterile procedural
arguments and delay the final resolution of some of the most important
cartel cases for fifteen years.
It is significant in historical terms that the Dyestuffs cartel had been
one of the most notorious organized international cartels dating from the
late 1920s. Its durability was underlined by the fact that the main players
had all been members of the original pre-war arrangements.45 The record of
41 1969 J.0. (L 192) 5.
42 id.
43 Case 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma NV v. Commission, 1970 E.C.R. 661.
44 See Imperial Chem. Indus., 1972 E.C.R. 619.
45 As early as 1927, a syndicate of French dyestuff producers led by Kuhlmann reached a
cartel agreement with I.G. Farben to respect each other's home markets, to sell jointly or
according to prescribed quotas and to fix prices. This European cartel was joined in 1929 by
a syndicate of Swiss producers, Imperial Chemical Industries ("ICI") joined in 1931, soon
followed by producers from most other European countries. During the 1930s, the cartel
controlled 60-70 percent of the world's total output of dyestuffs. See GEORGE W. STOCKING
& MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION: CASE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL BuSINESS
DIPLOMACY 505-507 (American Book-Stratford Press 1947).
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both the Commission and European Court is strangely silent as to the
sinister historical antecedents of the cartel. A reading of the decision and
judgments almost leaves the impression that although orchestrated, the
price-fixing that occurred between 1964 and 1967 was a spontaneous and
"one-off' event. The Commission had been alerted of the cartel by
complaints from customer trade bodies. Although it had conducted some
inspections, and there was some evidence of meetings being held in Basel
and elsewhere, the Commission had obviously not managed to obtain any
damning documentary evidence. Its decision to prosecute ultimately relied
on the similarities of timing and amount in the announced price increases as
well as an "expert's report" concluding that the only explanation was prior
concertation.
The Commission condemned the series of price rises as an illegal
concerted practice contrary to Article 85(1) and imposed what, even by the
standards of the time, were modest fines. Upholding the Commission's
decision in a judgment that provoked a storm of controversy and was to
have an interesting historical sequel,46 the Court of Justice stated that if
Article 85 draws a distinction between the concept of 'concerted
practice' and that of 'agreement between undertakings;' the object is to
bring within the prohibition of that Article a form of cooperation
between undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an
agreement so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical
cooperation between them for the risks of competition.47
The Court seems to have been attempting to establish that a "concerted
practice" was different from an agreement. It still had to search for some
form of mutual awareness and cooperation other than "agreement" in order
to attach liability and fines. The borderline, if any, between tacit agreement
and concerted practice was to elude definition for many years. If U.S.
lawyers feel a sense of djb vu, it is because "conscious parallelism" had
been a bone of contention in Sherman Act jurisprudence in a long line of
cases beginning in 1939 with Interstate v. United States.4 8 That case was
often cited mistakenly as authority for the proposition that a conspiracy
finding could be justified if firms acted in parallel and were aware of one
another's actions. Although the U.S. Supreme Court had always stopped
short of such a position, it was only in 1954 that it was settled that
conscious parallelism on its own was not to be equated with Sherman Act
conspiracy.
It should be remembered that in the 1970's the Commission had not
46 See infra note 76.
47 Imperial Chem. Indus., 1972 E.C.R. 619, at para. 64.
48 Interstate v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
49 See Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
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yet begun to use its full investigative powers under Council Regulation No.
17/62. Most "investigations" were carried out on notice, rarely
simultaneously on all the suspected participants and without the benefit of a
Commission decision. As a result, the Commission rarely discovered what
U.S. practitioners call the "smoking gun." During this time both the
Commission and the Court seem to have lost sight of the elementary
proposition that a full "agreement" can still be proved entirely by
circumstantial evidence. Instead, the label of "concerted practice" seems to
have been used even if there had been such an express agreement. The
terminology of the time perhaps reflected more differences in the type of
evidence relied on than the robustness of the commitment. Interestingly,
U.S. antitrust jurisprudence went through a similar period: the Courts often
talked of "tacit collusion" when they really meant cases where the
government or plaintiff relied on indirect evidence to prove the existence of
an actual agreement.
Indeed by the time of the Suiker Unie v. Commission5" in 1975, the
Court of Justice had already refined and limited its characterization of
"concerted practice" to make it clear that it considered this to refer to a far
more specific and subtle form of coordination: adherence to a common
business practice which reduces mutual uncertainty as to the present or
future conduct of commercial competitors and thereby enhance the
likelihood of coordinated behavior. In U.S. antitrust law this is known as
the "facilitating device."
F. Tackling the Oligopoly Problem
If lawyers and judges generally feel happier dealing with factual
issues, such as "good" or "bad" behavior or conspiracy doctrine rather than
price theory, economics is always going to rear its head in any assessment
of legal liability. After all, cartels may be delinquent conduct but they
occur in a commercial and market environment. To borrow from Justice
Clark in Theatre Enterprises, conspiracy has not yet read economics out of
the Sherman Act entirely.
51
Cartels are often discovered in concentrated markets in which there are
only a limited number of suppliers. Competition authorities do not like
oligopoly pricing. In fact, it is not uncommon to find an industry with few
competitors who call themselves competitors but never seem to compete
vigorously, have stable market shares and move their prices up in lockstep.
The suspicion is always that their prices are higher than would be seen in a
competitive market. As one distinguished former Assistant Attorney
General has pointed out, antitrust enforcers are rather romantically attached
50 Case 40/73, 1975 E.C.R. 1663.
51 Theatre Enters., 346 U.S. at 541.
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to the notion that prices should be set by competition. 2 Even economists
appear to agree that supra-competitive pricing is an unhealthy situation.
The problem for both the framers and the enforcers of a viable antitrust
regime is what to do about it. There are almost as many economic theories
about oligopoly pricing as there are economists. In the absence of
theoretical agreement on how such markets operate, the same parallel
pricing pattern could be invoked with apparent conviction as proof of either
cut-throat competition or of the darkest conspiracy. Viewed from the
outside, the absence of competition could be the manifestation of anything
from a common sense recognition by the individual operators that there is
no point in competing vigorously, to a full-blown price fixing cartel
meeting in the traditional smoke-filled room.
The phenomenon is fundamentally problematic for cartel enforcement,
especially where the regime is based on a system of prohibition and
sanction. The market structure may be relevant in two opposite ways:
regulators may attempt to invoke the characteristics of the concentrated
market, particularly the parallel movement of prices, as circumstantial
evidence of collusion, while the defense will argue that the outcome is to be
expected from the oligopolistic nature of the market. "Experts" will be
found to support both sides of the argument with total plausibility. The
economic evidence of parallel pricing is at best ambiguous, but economic
assessment is not going away.
It is not necessary to rehash the problems of understanding oligopoly
theory, which are exhaustively documented.53  The traditional structural
school contended that oligopolistic interdependence made higher-than-
competitive prices almost inevitable in an oligopoly setting. However, this
view was challenged by Stigler in his highly influential articles on antitrust
theory in 1964 and led to a change in the way economists approached the
question of coordination among competitors.5 4  The cornerstone of
economic analysis is the recognition that it is far from inevitable that
oligopolists will behave in an anti-competitive way. Whether or not they
collude expressly, in order to raise prices they will need to overcome the
"complicating factors" that stand in the way of parallel behavior by
achieving three critical elements: concurrence, co-ordination and
compliance. Of course, even if Stigler's ground-breaking article
revolutionized the thinking of economists and the courts, we are no nearer
52 John H. Shenefield, Antitrust-Looking Ahead, Remarks before the Financial Analysts
Federation, Washington, D.C. (June 29, 1977), in 13 J. OF REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. 661, 663 (1982).
53 See generally Kovacic, supra note 30; Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. DeSanti, Game
Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion, 38 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 113 (1993);
Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly
Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 143 (1993).
54 George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. OF POL. EcON. 44 (1964).
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to any consensus among experts. For example, while some Chicago School
adherents asserted that there can never be non-competitive pricing among
oligopolists without conspiracy, others held the equally strong conviction
that such conspiracies were intrinsically impossible as they would
inevitably break down under the weight of their own inherent
contradictions.55
The crucial issue is whether the players in an oligopolistic market
gamer their uncompetitive prices and supra-competitive profits as a result
of ineluctable market forces or whether they have acted in a deliberate
manner. The former is often invoked by defense advisers wishing to
downplay an allegation of collusion, while regulators often challenge such
an interpretation. Unfortunately, economic analysis, far from providing a
clear-cut answer, simply adds to the complexity of resolving the debate.
Theoretical economists have in fact been rather cautious in claiming
that their theories represent some incontestable natural law. After all,
literally dozens of theories of oligopoly of different orders of rigor have
been developed. Lawyers are somewhat less reticent. The variable
geometry of the oligopoly theory will fit almost every type of conduct. It
can be invoked to explain why prices stick and why they go up. In almost
every parallel pricing case, therefore, teams of expert economists are
produced to testify that the parallel pricing is the result of free market
forces-and on the other side equally distinguished economists will give
exactly the opposite opinion.
Economists and lawyers have been uneasy bedfellows in the resolution
of the almost intractable dilemmas presented by the need to identify some
sort of agreement among competitors. Economists tend not to draw a
distinction between "tacit" and "express" collusion, while for lawyers, used
to a conduct-based test, one of the most difficult problems in the whole
field of antitrust law is finding some "avoidable act" on which liability
could be affixed. How could economic operators be enjoined and still be
punished for doing something which the received knowledge taught was
inevitable? The Sherman Act, in particular, with its requirement of a
"contract, combination or conspiracy," raised the problem in an acute form.
As one distinguished legal and economic commentator observes:
"[t]he difficult issue of proving an agreement to fix prices from parallel
pricing and other circumstantial evidence is at the core of antitrust's
55 The Chicago School approach has come to dominate antitrust thinking and the
approach of the courts since the mid-1970s, so that "tacit collusion" is often used to denote
no more than an agreement proved through circumstantial evidence. Economic analysis of
the structure of the market environment that makes coordination more or less plausible is
relevant now only to determine whether an agreement exists in a parallel pricing case.
Baker, supra note 53, at 145-46.
56 HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note 10, at 148.
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longstanding efforts to attack the 'oligopoly problem.'
The so-called 'attack' on the oligopoly problem has been dogged by
evidential problems and attempts to reconcile two "poles" of the continu-im
of proof that demonstrate the existence of an agreement. At one extreme is
proof of direct exchange of assurances between rivals, the classic form of
evidence which shows the existence of an agreement. At the other end of
the continuum lies economic proof of patterns of behavior, that the
participants have followed similar business practices over a period of time.
As cartels went underground and the existence of direct and detailed
evidence was no longer readily available, the challenge for the courts was to
find a way of relying upon sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish
the existence of an agreement, which edged towards being pure evidence of
parallel behavior in the market, and yet remain within the legal meaning of
an agreement for the purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 5' This
dilemma highlights how economic theory could preclude courts from
inferring the existence of cartel agreements.5 9 Where economic analysis of
a market suggests that the economic environment is not conducive to
coordination, it will be irrational for the firms to reach an agreement not to
compete. If coordination is implausible, circumstantial evidence is unlikely
to demonstrate an agreement for the court. However, where the industry is
shown to be conducive to coordination, an agreement may be unnecessary
for the industry to reach the coordinated outcome. The court could
conclude that absent any direct evidence it will not infer the existence of an
agreement.
This dilemma has been grappled with in European cases. The
Dyestuffs case was in fact the first occasion on which the Commission and
Courts had to test the validity of "economic" evidence and argument. The
characterization of the infringement in that case as a "concerted practice"
was somewhat puzzling given the facts. While it is true that advance price
announcements figured strongly-on three occasions the ten or so
producers all announced identical price increases across the Community
within a day or so of one another-the Commission's decision revealed that
meetings had taken place in Basel and London to discuss prices just before
the simultaneous announcements.60 There was also other circumstantial
evidence of pre-arrangement. This surely sounds like an open and shut
"plus factors" case, inferring an actual agreement from circumstan ial
61evidence. Indeed, one leading U.S. commentator has observed that the
57 Baker, supra note 53, at 144-45.
58 See Kovacic, supra note 30, at 18-19.
59 Baker, supra note 53, at 146-47.
60 Imperial Chem. Indus., 1972 E.C.R. 619.
61 "Plus factors" may fall into one of three main categories: (1) hard evidence, typically
evidence of meetings that even without direct evidence of what was actually agreed ma) be
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evidence cited in the decision would have been ample to convict for a full
criminal price-fixing conspiracy in the United States.62
When the case came up on appeal, however, the Court of Justice
63
treated it as one of facilitating devices. It focused on the industry practice
of making advance price announcements: as the Court explained, this price
signaling tended to eliminate uncertainty between the producers as to their
future conduct and thus the business risk associated with a unilateral price
change.64
As for the necessary element of concertation, there was of course no
direct evidence of an articulated agreement to adopt the facilitating practice
of advance price announcements, but that was not required. The Court
found that, viewed as a whole, the three successive price increases showed a
progressive cooperation between the producers. The Dyestuffs case - just
like Interstate in the United States-is a case which for many years
continued "to fascinate the cognoscenti and to mislead the unwary." In a
much criticized and misunderstood passage, the Court stated that:
Although parallel behavior may not by itself be identified with a
concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a
practice if it leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond
to the normal conditions of the market.... This is especially the case if
the parallel conduct is such as to enable those concerned to stabilize
prices at a level different from that to which competition would have
led.
66
accepted as collusion; (2) parallel conducts that by its nature must be regarded as agreed
rather than spontaneous and could not have ever occurred without agreement, and (3)
evidence that the market structure and conditions are conducive to coordination. See
HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note 10, at 151; see also Kovacic, supra note 30, at 5.
62 BARRY E. HAWK, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 67 (2d ed. 1986
& Supp. 1987). The pattern of meetings to discuss prices followed by price rises present
little evidential challenge. See, e.g., Cont'l Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 143
(6th Cir. 1960). Hawk observes that the examples of "practical cooperation" cited by the
Court of Justice have been recognized by United States courts and commentators both as
facilitating devices and "plus factors:" "[t]herefore, the definition of concerted practices as
parallel conduct and practical cooperation - facilitating devices - is not significantly
different under Section 1 as parallel conduct and 'plus factors' - which in some cases are
facilitating devices."
63 Imperial Chem. Indus., 1972 E.C.R. at 619.
64 Id. at para. 110. HAWK, supra note 62 (observing that rather than attempting to rely on
structural factors as proof itself of a concerted practice, the structural inquiry in Dyestuffs
was made to evaluate whether the parallel announcements were a facilitating device, rather
along the lines employed by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") in United States v. Container
Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969)).
65 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION at para. 1426 (Vol. VI, 2000).
66 Imperial Chem. Indus., 1972 E.C.R. 619, at para. 66.
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Some academic writers attacked the Court's judgment in the Dyestuffs
case on the ground that it declared conscious parallelism presumptively
unlawful on the basis of economic evidence alone.67 However, the Court's
broad dictum has to be read in context: the judgment made it clear that
standing on its own conscious parallelism could not be found unlawful.
Whether or not there was actual collusion could be correctly determined
only if all the evidence on which the contested evidence was based was
treated not. in isolation but as a whole-echoes here again of the constant
U.S. antitrust case law on evidence in a conspiracy case. 68 There was in
fact a good deal of collusion evidence, even if the Court's analysis was
based more on the adoption of "facilitating practices" rather than on "plus
factors" pointing to a conspiracy. It is also important to appreciate that the
Court in its judgment relied on the so-called "structural factors" not as
circumstantial evidence to prove collusion but in order to assess whether the
advance price announcements could act as a facilitating device. The
parallel with the line taken by the U.S. courts in facilitating practices cases
where there was no explicit agreement or plan to adopt the device is
striking: the U.S. cases show that such agreement could be inferred where
adoption of the practice was motivated by an anticompetitive purpose or
produced an anticompetitive result.69
In the later Suiker case,7° the Court of Justice expanded on its earlier
dictum regarding concerted practice and emphasized that the coordination
in question did not in any way require the working out of an actual plan
agreed in advance; these are direct echoes of Interstate.71 Inherent in the
Treaty was the notion that each economic operator should determine its
behavior by itself. While nothing in Article 85 prevented firms from taking
into account the conduct of its rivals and adapting intelligently (i.e., 'mere'
conscious parallelism is not caught), it drew the line at "direct or indirect
contact ... the object whereof is either to influence the conduct on the
market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a
competitor the course which they themselves have decided to adopt or
67 See, e.g., F. A. Mann, The Dyestuffs Case in the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, 22 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 35 (1973); Valentine Korah, Concerted Practices, 36
MOD. L. REv. 220, 221 (1973); Rend Joliet, La Notion de Pratique Concertge et L'arrt
LC.L dans une Perspective Comparative, 3-4 CAHIERS DE DROrr EuROPtEN 251 (1974).
68 See supra note 33.
69 In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 906
F.2d. 432, 446 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that "...evidence concerning the purpose and effect of
price announcements, when considered together with the evidence concerning the parallel
pattern of price restorations, is sufficient to support a reasonable and permissible inference of
an agreement, whether express or tacit, to raise or stabilise prices").
70 Suiker Unie, 1975 E.C.R. at 1663.
71 Interstate v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 208 (1939).
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contemplate adopting in the market.,
72
This dictum seems to bring "price signaling" that falls short of
agreement expressly within the ambit of Article 85. There is perhaps
something to be said for interpreting Article 85 so as to present a single
concept of unlawful collusion rather than on the lines of the current U.S.
notion of the "contract, combination and conspiracy." However, if a
separate meaning does have to be attributed to the term "concerted
practice," it must surely be the concerted adoption of a facilitating practice
in circumstances where there is no obvious agreement. Separating the
facilitating practice analytically from "agreement" in such a way might also
reduce the risk of sanctions more appropriate to the full price fixing cartel
being imposed on what is less reprehensible conduct.
The Sugar and the Dyestuffs judgments demonstrate that, far from
endorsing decisions in cartel cases on parallel pricing alone, the Court was
insisting on the need for "plus evidence" for a decision to be sustainable.73
G. Woodpulp: A Rude Awakening
However those who thought that the ground rules had now been settled
were in for a rude awakening in the Woodpulp 74 case decided in March
1993. This case was the last direct appeal from the Commission to be heard
by the Court of Justice. In its decision,75 the Commission had condemned
the pricing practices of the leading suppliers of bleached sulphate wood
pulp between 1975 and 1981 and fined most of the forty-three addressees
(the total was a paltry 4 million Euros).
Woodpulp was essentially a parallel pricing case. All the main
producers supplying the Community pulp market invariably followed the
long-standing industry practice of announcing quarterly price rises at least a
few weeks in advance. The trade press gave wide coverage to the
announcements. Everyone's announced price was exactly the same with
only minor deviations. The whole industry used a standard delivered price
system with only two zones and the use of dollars.
72 Suiker Unie, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, at para. 174.
73 See also Cases 29/83 & 30/83, CRAM & Rheinzink v. Commission, 1984 E.C.R.
1679, 1702 (stating that:
the Commission's reasoning is based on the supposition that the facts established cannot be
explained other than by concerted action by the two undertakings. Faced with such an
argument, it is sufficient for the applications to prove circumstances which cast the facts
established by the Commission in a different legal light and thus allow another explanation of
the facts to be substituted for the one adopted by the contested decision).
74 Case C-89/85, A AhlstrOm Osakeyhtoie v. Commission, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1307.
75 Commission Decision of 19 December 1984, Woodpulp v. Commission, 1985 O.J. (L
85) 1.
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Besides the ambiguously worded main charge of "concertation" on
pricing addressed to almost all the parties, the Woodpulp decision purported
to identify a series of distinct infringements of Article 85-conspiracies
within the main conspiracy, as it were-which were also vaguely
characterized as "concertation."
Although there was a good deal of evidence of actual collusion, at least
up to 1977, it was not clear in the decision whether the gist of the
Commission's case on the main allegation was hardcore price fixing or
something less sinister. The distinction between direct cartel behavior and
price signaling was never really made; nor did the decision identify with
any precision the terms or nature of any underlying agreement or attempt to
spell out the role of each alleged participant. Some producers, however,
were obviously more deeply involved than others. This omission was to
prove fatal.
As evidence of the alleged "concertation" on the main charge, the
Commission had relied primarily "on a series of economic or structural
arguments and only in a subsidiary manner on 'hard' plus evidence - the
parallel conduct coupled with different kinds of 'direct and indirect
exchange of information."' This formulation, which tends to play down the
direct evidence, was curious, since the documents cited in the decision
clearly go far beyond a mere exchange of data. They reveal that at least up
to 1977 this was an industry where old fashioned price fixing was not
unknown. Besides some fairly unambiguous evidence of face to face
meetings implicating, in particular, many of the Scandinavian producers, it
was clear that the whole industry shared an awareness of the need for one
region to support another's prices so as to achieve stability and a uniform
price level for pulp. Even if there were some shadowy areas in the evidence
on price fixing, one might have been forgiven for thinking, based on the
Dyestuffs case, that this was a clear case of price signaling. Advance price
announcements and the universal adoption of a basing point system must
have facilitated the achievement of the remarkable pattern of uniform price
increases. In its judgment, however, the Court annulled virtually all of the
Commission's findings.76 The tone of the Court's judgment was intensely
hostile to the Commission, and the Commission was not helped by the
ambiguity of its decision as to whether the nub of its case was a classic
cartel or simply price signaling, even if the low fines imposed were
indicative of the latter.
76 There is a curious historical twist in this case. The Reporting Judge in this case had
himself achieved academic prominence by a disparaging critique of the Court of Justice's
judgment in Dyestuffs. He had condemned what he considered to be the Court's willingness
to conclude that there had been collusive behavior on the basis of price announcements
without clear evidence of concertation (in fact there had been some) or a thorough analysis
of the market. Joliet, supra note 67.
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It should be noted that the U.S. antitrust authorities may well treat
price signaling as part of a wider price fixing conspiracy. For the Court of
Justice however, the two 'theories' were mutually exclusive; the
Commission had to choose which of the two it was alleging. Was it
asserting that the system of price announcements was an infringement as
such, or was the phenomenon advanced as evidence of prior collusion?
Considering that the Commission had hedged on its answer, the Court
proceeded to examine both of these alternative hypotheses individually and
in complete isolation from one another.
If the nub of the Commission's case was price signaling, the court
stated that advance price announcements on their own did not lessen each
undertaking's uncertainty as to what its competitors might do: at the time it
made its announcement, it could not be sure of the future conduct of the
others. Therefore, the system of price announcements did not per se
infringe Article 85.
The Court then dismissed the separate "collusion" hypothesis out of
hand by rejecting all the hard evidence of meetings and contacts. The court
said that for each and every document relied upon, the Commission had to
specify between which producers and for what period the collusion
established by that document had occurred. The implication is that
collusion evidence has no relevance outside its own intrinsic facts. Because
the Commission had insisted that circumstantial evidence was not
susceptible to such mechanical analysis, the Court held that this collusion
evidence was completely inadmissible, stating tersely and in a baffling non-
sequitur that "in the light of that reply those documents must be excluded
from consideration.", 77 Since this left on the factual record little more than
the parallel pricing itself, the Court could perhaps have said that on the
evidence the burden of proof was not satisfied. Instead, having declared
inadmissible almost all the hard evidence of collusion, the Court then
proceeded on the basis of competing economic theory alone to examine
whether such collusion was likely - and found that it was not.78 Despite the
Advocate General's urging of caution in this regard, the Court relied
heavily for its factual conclusions on an expert's report which it had
commissioned itself and which, as it transpired, contained many contestable
assertions. 
The Court's highly compartmentalized approach both to the evidence
and the components of the alleged infringement is not easy for a common
lawyer to comprehend. Circumstantial evidence surely has to be considered
in its entirety: each item considered on its own may not establish the final
77 Case C-89/85, A Ah1strrm Osakeyhti6 and others v. Commission, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1307,
at para. 69.
78 Id. at paras. 126-27.
79 Id. at para. 137.
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probandum but taken together and in context each may reinforce the other
with regard to the facts in issue.
The U.S. Supreme Court has always stressed that in an antitrust
conspiracy case the evidence should not be fragmented: "[i]t hardly needs
statement that the character and effect of a conspiracy is (sic) not to be
judged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts but only by
looking at it as a whole. ' 8°
In Woodpulp, the Court seems even to have overlooked its own clear
statement twenty years before in the Dyestuffs case: ". . . the question
whether there was concerted action in this case can only be correctly
determined if the evidence upon which the contested decision is based is
considered, not in isolation, but as a whole." 81 It is no doubt true that the
Commission could have drawn the evidential strings together more tightly.
Perhaps it should have been wary of relying so heavily on "economic
plausibility" factors when there was hard evidence of collusion by many of
the producers. The evidence was not enough to draw all the fifty or so
addressees of the decision into a single common price fixing cartel, but the
sweepingly dismissive statement of the Court that "the Commission has no
documents which directly establish the existence of concertation between
the producers concerned," 82 needs, at the very least, to be read with some
qualification.
One can also be uneasy about the Court's complete exoneration of the
undertakings within the "price signaling" hypothesis. It surely cannot have
intended to create a rule for all future facilitating practices cases. The
argument that there was no absolute "certainty" is a bizarre one: even in a
full cartel with express exchange of assurance the conspirators can never be
entirely sure that one or other will not cheat. The experts also justified the
lockstep price increases as "natural" in view of the very market
transparency which the Commission had characterized as artificial, i.e.,
pricing in dollars, a delivered price system with only two zones and
quarterly list price changes. But natural or not, it surely involved deliberate
and avoidable action on the part of all the producers. This was not simply a
case of interdependent pricing, but of interdependent adherence to the
facilitating practice. To put it at its most neutral, the adoption of this
pricing mechanism by all the suppliers must at the very least have helped to
maintain a single price level throughout Europe. The definition of the
Court of a concerted practice in Sugar seems entirely apt to fit the conduct
in question here.
80 United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544 (1913).
81 Imperial Chem. Indus., 1972 E.C.R. 619, at para. 68.
82 A Ah/strom Osakeyhtoie, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1307, at para. 70.
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H. Conspiracy Comes to the Rescue
If the charitable assessment of the Court's Woodpulp judgment is to
say that it should be limited to its own facts, the clear lesson for the
Commission is that to prove collusion, economic factors are no substitute
for hard evidence. It must demonstrate the precise involvement of each
player in what might be a complex web of collusion. To do so adequately,
the Commission has to have what U.S. prosecutors call a "theory" of the
conspiracy. In cases which might lead to the imposition of fines, the
Commission would have to set out the evidence carefully and explain its
significance in terms of a system of proof. The heart of the issue is to frame
the accusation explicitly and correctly. The Court's judgment also
underlines the need to distinguish between the full price-fixing conspiracy
and mere facilitating devices in an Article 81 analysis.
For the Commission, the problem was how to wrap up the involvement
in varying degrees, and possibly for differing periods of time, of the
participants in a complex, continuing and concealed scheme of collusion, in
a manner that satisfied both the demands of specificity and the strict
standards of proof demanded by the judicial instances. The answer,
previously provided in a series of investigations and decisions in cartel
cases, adopted a very different methodology from that employed in
Woodpulp and had already received the endorsement of the Court of First
Instance.
The essence of this approach lay in constructing and proving with
convincing evidence an allegation which caught the overarching illegality
of the common scheme, but at the same time, identified the precise
involvement of each of the participants over the whole duration of the
activity. In short, it amounted to importing into European competition law
the concept of the conspiracy. This development was not so much the
result of the conscious adoption at a high level by the Commission of a
focused policy for dealing with cartels as the convergence of a number of
various strands of initiatives.
Following the accession of new member States, including the first with
a common law tradition, and a new intake of officials who may have been
more instinctively sympathetic than their continental counterparts with
"Anglo-Saxon" notions of conspiracy, the early 1980s saw a marked
upsurge in the Commission's use of its investigating powers under Council
Regulation No. 17/62.83 The Commission's power to carry out
investigations on the spot entitle the officials to have access to the business
premises, to examine the books and other business records, to take copies
83 At the time, the European Court of Justice had no common law jurists. If conspiracy
as an inchoate crime is unknown in continental jurisprudence and the concept is generally
viewed with suspicion by civilian lawyers, many European legal systems have shaped
specific legislation against criminal organization. See, e.g., Ital. C.P., at art. 416.
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thereof and to ask for oral explanations. Now, in order to uncover major
cartels, the investigations were being ordered by Commission decision
without prior warning to the companies and were carried out
simultaneously across the Community. Once inside, the officials are also
entitled to search, in the sense that they can look actively for documents in
the place they are kept rather than wait hopefully for the firm to produce
them.
The Commission may not have had the sort of firepower which the
U.S. Justice Department can bring to bear in a criminal cartel conspiracy in
the United States. There are no grand juries, no telephone monitoring and
no intimidating FBI "drop-by" home visits. The Commission has no
jurisdiction over individuals. However, selective use of the "dawn raid" in
these cases resulted in the discovery of a wealth of direct documentary
proof of the systematic cartelization of some major European industries.
In some of these cases, the Commission discovered the original cartel
"blueprint"-the planning documents detailing the common design and the
mechanisms by which it was to be implemented. Across different
industries, the pattern was almost invariably the same: a two-tier structure
with senior directors from each company-called the "Popes" and
"Elephants" (in the Pre-Insulated Pipes cartel), "Bosses" or "Heads of
State" (in the LdPE cartel) 84-- making the strategic decisions, while a lower
level of managers worked out the details. Meetings were held monthly,
usually in Switzerland. Almost invariably, the same Swiss fiduciary
company provided a supposedly "anonymized" data exchange system,
which was used by the cartel participants to monitor the accuracy of their
sales declarations to their fellow conspirators in meetings; at times the same
"trustee" acted as the meeting chairman and cartel secretary. In some cases,
information was discovered in locations and offices that the makers had
forgotten about or failed to clean up while the officials were delayed by
some pretext. This included full documentation recording the details of the
negotiations and outcome of each meeting in explicit detail as well as the
exhaustively detailed and complex annual calculations for allocating sales
quotas. Memoranda of telephone conversations or pep talks by the cartel
chairman with each of the members were also obtained. The internal
instructions by which the head office of each participant ordered its sales
subsidiaries in each country to implement price lists, often running to
hundreds of items, which had clearly been agreed in the cartel meetings,
completed the picture.
While there was direct evidence on all the central issues, particularly
on the fact of "agreement," in each case it was necessary to resort to some
extent to circumstantial evidence, if only to fill in gaps in the story. Not all
84 More junior executives responsible for carrying out the agreements reached by the
ringleaders were often given less illustrious titles.
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producers, for instance, might have kept their full set of pricing instructions
over the life of cartel, but their continuing participation in meetings during
the whole time and their own involvement in the quota schemes was amply
established by other evidence.
The participants, all major Blue Chip international companies with a
presumably unlimited legal budget, including some U.S. producers,
deployed every conceivable tactic to fight the cases. No procedural
argument was left unexploited. Indeed, the defense tactic attracted the
sympathy of some elements in the legal establishment. In one of the most
bizarre episodes in the judicial history of the Communities, a judgment 85 by
one chamber of the Court of First Instance (finding the Commission
decision 86 in a cartel case "non-existent") threatened to derail the whole
established body of Community decisions from the preceding twenty-five
years. The Commission persisted and with a change in the composition of
the deciding tribunal, the stance it had taken was vindicated in a series of
judgments that both approved the Commission's "conspiracy" approach and
dismissed procedural arguments that had previously found a measure of
judicial favor.
Had this occurred in the United States, it is extremely doubtful
whether the cases would ever have come to a full trial on such
overwhelming evidence. Invariably revelations of such blatant
conspiratorial behavior would have resulted in a plea bargain (with
negotiated jail sentences) and a civil settlement with the injured parties.
I. Framing the Charge
The main contribution of those cartel decisions to European case law,
taken by the Commission and subsequently approved by the Court of First
Instance and later the Court of Justice, lies in establishing what has been
identified as the "cartel as a whole" prosecution theory. In view of their
identical purpose, the component elements of the cartel, consisting of a
whole complex of interlinked schemes and arrangements to set prices, fix
quotas and police the agreement, running over several years were not to be
split up into a number of separate infringements. The component elements
had to be treated as a whole, and the first explicit declaration of this
principle is in Polypropylene.87 The overall plan of the producers was to
meet and reach agreement on specific matters, including the fixing of target
prices, the modalities of concerted price initiatives, the allocation of quotas
or other measures to control sales volumes, and the exchange of detailed
information so as to facilitate the coordination of their behavior. However:
85 Case T-79/89, BASF v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. 11-315.
86 PVC, 1989 O.J. (L 74) 2.
87 Polypropylene Decision, 1986 O.J. (L 230) 1.
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[t]he Commission considers that the whole complex of schemes and
arrangements decided in the context of a system of regular and
institutionalized meetings constituted a single continuing
'agreement' within the meaning of Article 85(l).88
In Polypropylene, in contrast to the failed catch-all "group collusion"
approach of Woodpulp, the Commission tackled the problem of
characterizing the detailed operation of the cartel as participation "in an
overall framework agreement which was manifested in a series of more
detailed sub-agreements worked out from time to time., 89 By the time of
the PVC decision three years later, the Commission felt confident enough to
move from this half-way position and assert that:
[T]he collusion is however to be considered not so much as a series
of discrete agreements each with different adherents, but as the
execution of a broad continuing agreement with the same
participants, the same procedures and the same common object,
namely to establish a mechanism for volume control and
concentration on pricing.
90
This approach was endorsed by the Court of First Instance in its
ground-breaking 1991 Polypropylene judgment. Observing that it would be
artificial to split up such continuous conduct, characterized by a single
purpose, by treating it as a number of separate infringements, the Court
added: "[t]he fact is that the [undertakings] took part - over a period of
years - in an integrated set of schemes constituting a single infringement,
which progressively manifested itself in both unlawful agreements and
unlawful concerted practices." 9'
In Article 1 of the operative part of its "re-adopted" decision in the
PVC II case, which sums up its findings, the Commission held that the
parties had
Infringed Article 85 of the EC Treaty.. .by participating for the
periods identified in this Decision in an agreement and/or concerted
practice originating in or about August 1980 by which the producers
supplying PVC in the Community took part in regular meetings in
order to fix target prices and target quotas, plan concerted initiatives
to raise price levels and monitor the operation of the said collusive
arrangements.
92
88 Id. at para. 81.
89 Id. at para. 181.
90 PVC, 1989 O.J. (L 74) 2, at para. 31.
91 Case T-1/89, Rh6ne-Poulenc v. Commission, 1991 ECR 11-867, at para. 126.
92 PVC II, 1994 O.J. (L 239) 14, at art. 1.
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The accusation thus focuses on the "conspiracy" aspect of the
arrangement: (a) an over-arching plan, the essential characteristics of
which are identified, and (b) the implementation of which each of the
producers participated for specific periods and possibly in varying roles of
involvement.
As the PVC II decision avers:
[A]n agreement within the meaning of Article (81) may exist where the
parties reach a consensus on a plan which limits or is likely to limit their
commercial freedom by determining the lines of their mutual action or
abstention from action in the market. No enforcement procedures such
as might be foreseen in the case of a civil law contract are required.
93
Further, just as had occurred in the United States, the Commission in
these later decisions has "operationalized" the concept of the prohibited
antitrust "agreement." In the past, given the relative paucity of direct
collusion evidence, the starting point for any inquiry had of necessity been
the observed parallel pricing itself: the Commission had to work backwards
from the "outcome" of the cartel with all the tricky analytical problems that
such work backwards might involve. However, with the evidentiary record
now full of direct proof of the whole complex of secret discussions,
negotiations and meetings, the focus of the prohibition of Article 85 is now
upon the "process." This process includes the partnership for unlawful
purposes with all the possible disagreements that may occur in a partnership
or a family without affecting the cohesion of the overall shared purpose and
common design. The Commission stated that:
In relation to one or other aspect of the arrangements a particular
producer or group of producers may from time to time have had
reservations or been dissatisfied about some specific point.., the
agreement to which the Commission takes objection relates to a
continuing enterprise or partnership between the producers to prevent,
restrict or distort competition in the PVC market over a period of several
years.
94
The term "agreement" is applied not only to the specific agreement on
the basic scheme which is to be operated by the parties or to the exact terms
which may be agreed from time to time, but also to the whole continuing
process in which they are involved. The term "agreement" covers the entire
bargaining process leading up to or following the actual agreement in terms
and may include reaching inchoate understandings or conditional
agreements. Indeed, as was pointed out in Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel,
93 Id. at para. 30.
94 Id. at para. 31.
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"[f]ormal agreement may never be reached on all matters. Agreement in
one area may exist alongside conflicts in another. Competition may not be
entirely eliminated. 95  The Commission went on to observe the fickle
dynamic which characterized this typical cartel, in which the parties
Had set up an infrastructure of regular meetings and were involved in a
continuous process of business diplomacy aimed at reconciling their
respective interests ... (t]he discussions may have involved a shifting
constellation of alliances, even threats of reprisal or hostile action, but
as part of the developing process of understandings and partial
agreements intended to fix prices, coordinate price increases and allocate
markets and market shares they constituted cartel conduct prohibited by
Article 85(l).96
Just as with the Sherman Act "conspiracy," this approach underlines
the fact that the principal vice of the prohibited behavior lies in "collective
decision making plus mutual assurance of compliance. 97  The Pre-
Insulated Pipes cartel decision, in an echo of Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Sun
Corporation,98 condemns "joint decision-making and commitment to a
common scheme." 99
This approach-made possible only by the Commission's full use of
its investigative powers to make a historical reconstruction of the cartel's
activities despite all efforts at concealment-neatly moves the debate away
from the semantics of whether the behavior complained of is an
"agreement" or a "concerted practice." The concepts are fluid and may
overlap. In all these cases, the Commission has stretched in order to
describe the cartel principally as an "agreement." In Pre-Insulated Pipes,
the drafter of the decision disposed of an old analytical fallacy which had
been argued over so fruitlessly in earlier cases. The decision stated that "it
is not a correct analysis to categorize the terms of the bargain struck by the
parties at a particular moment as the 'agreement' and its subsequent
implementation over time as a 'concerted practice."'"
00
Drawing on the characterization of a "concerted practice" by the Court
in the Sugar case as more of a "facilitating device," the Commission now
tends to apply this particular label not to the full price fixing conspiracy but
to the knowing adoption of or adherence to some collusive mechanism
which encourages or facilitates the coordination of their behavior.
95 Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel, 1999 O.J. (L 24) 1, at para. 134.
96 Id. at para. 137.
97 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1404-19 (2003).
98 Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Sun Corp, 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
99 Pre-Insulated Pipe, 1999 O.J. (L 24) at para. 129.
10o Id. at para. 132.
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Companies operating on the fringes of the cartel or knowingly going along
with it may be described-charitably perhaps-as parties rather to a
concerted practice than to an 'agreement.'
In any case, where there is a complex infringement of long duration, it
is not necessary or even possible to untangle the two forms of prohibited
conduct: the violation may present simultaneously the characteristics of
both. Viewed entirely in isolation, a particular manifestation of the cartel
could present one aspect more than another, but Article 81 lays down no
specific category for a complex infringement.
The Commission's approach then is broadly that, as in conspiracy, all
those who are clearly partners in the scheme - junior or senior does not
matter - are parties to an "agreement." The Court of Justice confirmed this
in January 2004 in an appeal against the Commission decision in the
Cement case. It neatly summarizes the European approach which has now
clearly endorsed the common law notions of a conspiracy:
the fact that an undertaking has not taken part in all aspects of an
anti-competitive scheme or that it played only a minor role in the
aspects in which it did participate is of no relevant to the
establishment of the existence of an infringement.. .. Where it is
established that an undertaking was aware of the offending conduct
of the other participants or that it could reasonably have foreseen it
and that it was prepared to take the risk, it is also regarded as
responsible, throughout the entire period of its participation in that
infringement, for conduct put into effect by other undertakings in the
context of the same infringement.' 01
J. Evidence in Cartel Cases
Regarding the treatment of evidence, the use, just as in a conspiracy, of
the declarations of one participant made in furtherance of the conspiracy
against all the others are in striking parallel with the common law. The
Commission and the Courts are distinctly unimpressed by arguments from
the others that the evidence is "inadmissible" because they were not aware
of the existence of the document or party to its making. Where the
members of a cartel are major corporations doing business worldwide,
internal communications within each firm which were necessary to apprise
superiors or others "in the know" of the negotiations with competitors and
their outcome are clearly intended to further the conspiracy: without them,
it simply could not operate.'
0 2
101 Case C-204/00, Aalborg Portland A/S v. Commission (Jan. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.curia.eu.int/en/actu/communiques/cp04/aff/ cp040002en.htm (last visited Apr.
22, 2004).
102 See supra note 35.
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The Commission also generally adopts the system of proof-
"Hornbook law" to any criminal practitioner - that while it is necessary to
establish against each addressee of the decision, by coherent proof, that it
participated in the violation, this does not (as the defense always argued)
require that there be direct proof that every alleged participant expressly
gave its assent to, or committed some overt act in support of, each and
every individual aspect or manifestation of the cartel throughout its entire
duration. This would simply be to reward those who are most successful in
covering up their tracks or destroying the evidence.
As the Court of First Instance confirmed in one of its Polypropylene
judgments - Rh6ne Poulenc v. Commission' 03-the proper approach is to
demonstrate the existence, operation and salient features of the cartel as a
whole. It is then to determine whether there is credible and persuasive
proof to link each participant to the common scheme and during what
period each one gave its adherence.10 4
K. Delinquent Behavior
Evidence of participation in a cartel may be established by various
means, since cartel participants do not conduct their affairs with the
convenience of fact-finders in the forefront of their minds. Cartels do not
act in the same manner as criminals on the street. The practical difficulty
for the Commission is to locate and seize evidence of activity which by its
very nature is clandestine. Therefore, it was obliged to develop the
technique of the "dawn raid" to a fine art, which proved successful as a
detector of cartels. Later, in imitation of the U.S. Justice Department's
prized weapon, the bait of leniency was used to extract confessions and
cooperation from the participants themselves. Both of these proactive,
sometimes aggressive, detection strategies attracted harsh criticism from
legal and business interest groups. Curiously, for a long time the debate in
Europe was not over the iniquity of the business conduct revealed by the
Commission's investigations but on the human rights of the cartel
participants. ° 5 Few if any commentators adverted to the harm done by
cartels and the advocates of enforcement were almost a persecuted
minority. If this was a deliberate strategy, in the end it was self-defeating
for the cartels. 0 6 Insistence by the Courts on a high burden for the standard
103 Rh6ne-Poulenc, 1991 ECR 11-867.
1041d
105 For students of industrial history, the regular invocation of human rights by certain
major chemical companies has a certain historic irony. See Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88,
Hoechst v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 2859. See generally HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note
10, at 190-96.
106 In an appeal by National Panasonic against one of the earliest dawn raids, the
appellant company invoked Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
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of proof and the intensive standard of review applied by the Court of First
Instance, had the result that the Commission was obligated to dig deep to
retrieve evidence. Instead of being able to rely, as in the earlier cases, on
parallel pricing with a few not very "strong" plus factors, investigators had
to find the smoking gun in order to stand any chance of being able to prove
a case. In practice, the Commission uncovered a whole arsenal.
10 7
In case after case, the full extent of the illegal cartel activities subtly
but progressively influenced the official attitudes. The very scale of the
turpitude was then revealed. It was highly organized, with senior level
perpetrators and a deeply cynical attitude of the participants. 0 8  These
characteristics meant that officialdom, however hesitatingly, came to accept
the harmful nature of cartels. No longer could business supporters shrug off
price fixing as normal entrepreneurialism. Authorities began to crack down
on price fixing activity with a zeal that had not been manifest in the 1980's
and 1990's despite the successes chalked up by investigators in individual
cases. In 2000, Commissioner Mario Monti famously condemned cartels as
"cancers on the open market economy."
10 9
Once the ball began rolling, it became a self-perpetuating exercise.
Enforcement agencies began imposing punitive corporate fines upon
discovery of the broad range of industries engaging in systematic
clandestine behavior. In turn, these high fines, previously a seven-day
wonder, reported in the press but forgotten as soon as the next story came
along, attracted an unprecedented level of public interest. The scandal
generated by the Pre-insulated Pipes cartel in Scandinavian countries where
public attitudes had hitherto been largely tolerant of cartels, as witnessed by
reactions to Cartonboard cartel just a few years previously, may have
contributed in no small measure to the hardening of perceptions in the
Nordic area and the adoption of national legislation outlawing cartels.
Although the legislation did not criminalize the conduct, it provided for
administrative fines.
argued that the surprise nature of the investigation violated basic rights of commercial
privacy. The Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the public interest in law
enforcement outweighed rights of privacy. Case 136/79, National Panasonic v. Commission,
1980 E.C.R. 2033.
107 For example, during a 'dawn raid' on a company suspected of participating in the
Polypropylene cartel, the Commission discovered the 'blueprint' for the PVC Cartel case,
misfiled in the polypropylene folder.
108 In many of the worst cartel cases, the Commission uncovered evidence that the illegal
operations had continued as before after successful dawn raids had been conducted, but with
even greater efforts to disguise them.
109 Commissioner Mario Monti, Fighting Cartels Why and How: Why Should We Be
Concerned with Cartels and Collusive Behavior?, Remarks at the 3rd Nordic Competition
Policy Conference Stockholm (Sept. 11-12, 2000) (transcript available at http:!!
europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-actin.gettxt=-gt&dc=SPEECH/00/295101RAPID
&lg=EN).
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Of course it would be idle to pretend that the gradual change in
attitudes towards cartels in Europe was solely the result of the
Commission's successes. It is doubtful if international enforcement woiild
ever have achieved the unstoppable momentum it did without the shocking
revelations in the Archer Daniel Midland (ADM) case in the United States
and the subsequent global crusade led by the U.S. Justice Department."10
Enforcement efforts had to be redoubled after the U.S. Justice Department
went around the world showing packed audiences at legal conferences its
secretly-recorded videos of some of the most candid episodes in the cartel's
life. One such video revealed a senior ADM executive confiding to his
cartel colleagues:
[t]he only thing we need to talk here because we are gonna get
manipulated by these goddam buyers .... They can be smarter than us
if we let them be smarter... they are not your friend. They are not my
friend .... You're my friend. I wanna be closer to you than I am to any
customer. I'"
The element of conspiracy revealed by such utterances in itself
provides the policy ground for censure. Official attitudes in Europe have
shifted from a purely "economic" approach - as manifested in the academic
and scholastic debates surrounding the Dyestuffs saga-to one based on
condemning bad behavior and bad attitude. Adopting the "conspiracy
approach" in European jurisprudence has effected a major change in the
way cartels are perceived and regulated. Even if the Commission has
stopped short of using the actual word in its decisions, it is always hanging
unspoken over every Commission decision in a cartel case and acts as a
powerful agent for change.
Even if it can now justifiably be said that the notion of conspiracy has
been embraced in European practice, this sits uneasily with the continuing
evolution of cartel enforcement in Europe at a national level. In recent
years there has been a trend towards a more high-profile and vigorous fight
against the most serious international cartels. 12 A number of European
countries have enacted penal legislation intended to bring the full force of
the criminal law against price fixers. 1 3  While at first sight this
110 Audiotape: U.S. Department of Justice, Vitamin Cartel investigation from a recording
of a cartel meeting in Maui, Hawaii (Mar. 10, 1994).
"' Videotape: Remarks by an ADM executive at a cartel meeting (Mar. 10, 1994)
(videotape on file with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation).
112 See OECD, Statement on the Association by Non-Members with the OECD Council
Recommendation on Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels (C(98)35/Final), Apr. 27-
28, 1998, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/l/63/2380310.pdf (last visited Apr. 22,
2004).
113 In the United Kingdom, Sections 188-190 of the Enterprise Act 2002, introduce a new
cartel offence for individuals where they dishonestly agree to typical cartel arrangements.
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development should bring European cartel enforcement even closer to the
U.S. model of prosecution, there are a number of very real and practical
difficulties which may undermine the level of sophistication reached at a
European level by the Commission in cartel enforcement. In particular,
there is a very stark juxtaposition between Member States who have
criminalized cartels and those - the majority of Member States-who
refuse to accept that the prosecution of cartels is a matter for criminal law.
The European hardening of attitudes against cartels has, therefore, not given
rise to a convergence of methodologies in mainland Europe but has had the
effect of repositioning countries like the United Kingdom and Ireland.l"
4
It remains to be seen how criminalization at a national level will
interface with the administrative regulation of cartels at a European level.
For example, the Office of Fair Trading in U.K. cases will concurrently
investigate and prosecute an individual under the Enterprise Act 2002 and
bring administrative proceedings against the company under the
Competition Act 1998, while also potentially assisting the European
Commission with its investigations under Article 81. Eventually, the Office
of Fair Trading will have to apply Article 81 itself with the 'modernization'
and delegation of the application of EC competition rules to national
authorities in all but the most serious of cases starting on May 1, 2004. In
other words, both criminal and administrative regimes, and national and
European jurisdictions, will be brought together under the umbrella of a
single investigation.
It is clear that the prosecution of cartels by individual Member States
does not fit with the administrative enforcement regime of the Commission.
Inevitably it will raise questions of consistency between decisions, and
double jeopardy arguments may be raised against the same conduct being
subject of both administrative and criminal sanctions. The precise role that
may be placed by national prosecution, particularly criminal prosecution,
remains to be seen.
Moreover, inherent in the national regimes themselves are legal
problems which also undermine the evolution of conspiracy as a basis for
cartel enforcement in modem European cartel law. The United Kingdom
has defined its cartel offence without reference to either the European or
Unlike the analogous provisions of the Sherman Act, the crime can only be committed by
individuals. Corporations can only be proceeded against administratively. The maximum
penalties are imprisonment for up to five years and/or a fine. See also Irish Competition Act
(2002) (imposing a maximum penalty of five-year term of imprisonment), available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20040-n.htm#1 88.
114 See Julian M. Joshua, A Sherman Act Bridgehead in Europe, or a Ghost Ship in Mid-
Atlantic? A Close Look at the United Kingdom Proposals to Criminalise Hardcore Cartel
Conduct, 5 EuR. COMPETITION LAW. REv. 231; see also Julian M. Joshua, The U.K. 's New
Cartel Offence and its Implications for the E. C. Competition Law: A Tangled Web, 5 EUR.
LAW. REV. 620.
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Sherman Act frameworks. In an attempt to capture only the most serious of
crimes and to define the offence in a way which is "both clear and easy for
business and the courts to understand,"' 15 the draftsmen have regrettably
chosen perhaps one of the most confusing notions in English law -
dishonesty.11 6 Reluctance to use the notion of conspiracy is perhaps based
upon a misunderstanding of the context in which "conspiracy" is used in the
Sherman Act: it is not employed as a device to frustrate inchoate crime in
the general criminal law, but simply to define the type of "'agreement" as
the ground for finding liability in the special factual circumstances of covert
cartels. 17 Having adopted "dishonesty" to define the offence, it is a case of
"watch this space" until such time as the authorities and the English courts
have grappled with and ultimately rationalized the offence. In the end, it is
feared that the practical efficacy which the British government was so keen
to impart into its crack-down on cartels may be undermined by the
reluctance to follow the United States, and ultimately European,
''conspiracy" approach.
115 Department of Trade and Industry, A World Class Competition Regime, CM5233, at
paras. 7, 19 (July 2001), available at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/
document/cm52/5233/5233.htm.
116 An integral element of the offence is the agreement between the individuals, and the
"dishonesty" requirement appears to have been an attempt to introduce an element of moral
reprehensibility. It is unfortunate that "conspiracy" was not used, being a well-established
term in English law. As this paper has shown, its particular rules of evidence suit it to the
prosecution of the very particular crime of cartel activity, catching cartels even after they
have gone underground. For a fuller discussion, see Julian M. Joshua, The Criminalisation
of Cartels in the U.K.: Rhetoric or Reality?, Remarks at the IBC Financial Services
Conference (Mar. 2003); Philip Lowe, What's the Future for Cartel Enforcement, Remarks
at the Conference of Understanding Global Cartel Enforcement (Feb. It, 2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/commn/competition/speeches/text/sp2003 044 en.pdf.
17 In England and Wales, the general criminal law, embodied in the Criminal Law Act
1977, limits the use of the doctrine of conspiracy to agreements to commit crimes.
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